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INTRODUCTION 
In her book. Gender Trouble, Judith Butler reinforces the conception held by many feminist 
philosophers that gender identity is not natural but rather culturally-constructed. Butler supports this 
conception ofgender mainly by reading (and misreading) Freud. I will undertake a critical reconstruction 
of Butler's claims about gender identity which are based on Freud. In order to complete this project, I 
will outline (J) currents offemin.ism leading us to this question of the coostructedness ofgender, (2) 
Freud's theories, especially rus account of sexual development and (3) two of Butler's main criticisms of 
Freud. Through this exploration, I will explain Butler's use of Freud in constructing a theory ofgender 
identity. 
The main challenge of this project is to "translate" Butler's claims into the style ofwriting and 
thinking familiar to analytic prulosophy. Butler's text is difficult, jargon-ridden, and dense. Further, she 
does not always explicitly state her arguments. Both the locating and the reconstructing of Butler's 
claims will be challenging. A clear reconstruction will require that I translate her writing into the analytic 
style. In making this change, my goal is not to comment on the relative value of the writing styles 
characteristic of analytic and postmodern philosophy. What I concern myselfwith, rather, is presenting 
Butler's ideas in what I believe is less complicated, and more accessible, language. 
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When assessing Butler's claims about the constructedness ofpractically everything. one might 
wonder how feminist philosophy ever got here. To help the reader understand this, I will briefly recount 
how the two "waves" of feminism arose and how Judith Butler fits into the feminist debate. 
There is no need to list the many forms ofwomen's oppression; it has occurred throughout 
history and throughout the world Civil and religious law have bestowed rights upon men that have been 
denied women. The hierarchy ofthe home has ranked men above women and has treated women as 
servants, property and objects. Yet, there have been huge changes in women's situation in recent years. 
Many ofthese changes were due in part to the feminist movement. Feminism, broadly defined as a 
movement for the emancipation ofwomen, has probably existed in some form or another as long as 
women have been oppressed, but I begin my history with nineteenth-century feminism. I choose this era 
offeminism, called the "first wave" because it marks the origins of feminist theory as it is practiced in the 
academy today. First-wave feminists claimed that women deserved the same rights as men and their main 
political task was to win the vote for women. There were two distinct philosophical tactics that feminists 
typically used to argue for women's rights: arguments from sameness and arguments from difference. 
Some stated that women and men should enjoy the same socio-political status because men and women 
were basically the same. Others worked for the same end, but reasoned that women had specific female 
characteristics, and that these characteristics were valuable. Some theorists even employed both tactics. 
Elizabeth Cady Stanton, a US suffragist active in the 1850s, was one ofthese theorists. Stanton argued 
for women's suffrage because she thought "the rights ofevery human being are the same and identical." 
However, she also claimed that women would make a distinctive contribution to the voting population, 
and, because oftheir distinctive characteristics, women would balance the vote ofmen. l 
Whether these first-wave theorists were using difference, sameness or both to fight for women's 
rights, they shared certain assumptions that the next "wave" of feminists would come to challenge. 
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Before] 950, people generally did not think it problematic to asswne that sex was something that had 
simple objective reality; there were men and there were women, and every person was surely one or the 
other. Furthermore, men and women each had their own distinct characteristics. Men were supposedly 
more aggressive, logical, and mechanically-minded than women, while women were supposedly more 
passive, emotional and nurturing than.men. Desire" too,. was. bound up. in.the- differenc.e between Jh.e. 
sexes. Normally, it was thought, men desired women, and women desired men. There were counter­
examples, ofcourse; some women were logical, while some men were emotional, and some men desired 
men while some women desired women. But these people were considered exceptions to the rule. 
Mainstream society saw them as confused, sick, or even sinful. .The popular view was.that.atJeast.some, 
ifnot all, ofthe ways that people behaved were determined by their sex. To a large extent, biology was 
thought to be destiny. 
In The Second Sex (1949), Simone de Beauvoir challenged this predominant conception of sexual 
difference. Beauvoir famously claimed in the book that "One is.not bOll4 but rather becomes1 a woman.,,2 
Beauvoir's revolutionary claim was that what it is to be a man or a woman has more to do with culture 
than with biology. Of course biological differences existed, she thought; Beauvoir did not challenge, what 
she saw as anatomical facts. However, she suggested that our understanding ofwhat it is to be sexed 
came from culture, not from biology, and that people confused this cultural phenomenon ofgender with 
the biological reality Qfs~2',. A.woJlJaTl, in Beauvoir's view, was not something that one simply was 
because ofher biology. Women were "made" through society's investing ofcultural significance onto the 
bodies in which they were born. This process was continuous, so "women" were always becoming 
women; they were constantly reassessing what it meant to be gendered as women within their cultural 
context. 
In The Second Sex Beauvoir also claimed that women were "sexed" by being differentiated from 
men. Beauvoir argued that theorists in the Western philosophical tradition saw things in terms ofbeing 
true or false, good or bad, light or dark, etc., and that they sometimes used these binaries to explain 
concepts that were not diametrically opposed. Beauvoir thought that sexual difference was one ofthese 
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concepts to which binaries were incorrectly applied. What was worse, when sex was framed in terms of 
these binaries, the good, true, light side of the binary was associated with men, while women were 
associated with the evil, false, dark side. Another offense ofthe Western thinkers, thought Beauvoir, was 
that they gave the female side of the binary no positive reality. The positive/negative contrast is easy to 
see in the light/dark binary: light has positive reality, while darkness only negative, the lack oflight. Like 
the light/dark example, women were seen as a lack, specifically the lack ofbeing men. Because they 
were the only ones with positive reality, men were the only ones that were truly sexed; women were the 
Other, not-Men. 
There are many examples to support ofBeauvoir's claim that women are negatively defined in 
the men/women binary. One that is perhaps most deeply ingrained in our culture is the biblical creation 
story from Genesis 2. In this story, the man, Adam, is created first, and the woman, Eve, is created 
second and literally from him. Adam has positive reality-he was created by God, for God's sake. God 
created Eve as well, but it was from a piece of Adam's body. Furthermore, Eve's designated purpose at 
the time ofher creation was to be Adam's helper and companion. In the same story, Eve is the temptress 
who lures Adam into eating the apple and is therefore responsible for humanity's being banished from 
paradise. In this one story, we have a portrayal ofthe woman as the Other (she is created from Adam), 
and also the woman as the temptress, falling to evil. The binary is clear: man is good and woman is not 
good. 
Drawing heavily on Beauvoir, second-wave feminism emerged in the 1960s and 1970s. Second­
wave feminists challenged earlier assumptions about the role that sex played in the formation of the 
identity. These feminists used the distinction between anatomically sexed bodies and the cultural 
consequence of those sexed bodies suggested by Beauvoir and created a way to refer to each of these 
components: they asserted that characteristics and behaviors were one thing and bodies were another, and 
that the relation between the two was not as simple as previously thought. Feminists designated 
biological difference 'sex', and used the terms 'female' and 'male' to refer to the sexes. Indicators of sex 
included external and internal organs, hormones, chromosomes and secondary sex characteristics. 
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'Gender', on the other hand, was deemed the cultural construction of sex: gender was what it meant to be 
sexed within a culture. The tenus 'feminine' and 'masculine' were used to refer to the genders. 
ENTER BUTLER 
Judith Butler joined the debate when the second-wave sex/gender distinction reigned and when 
the distinction was thought to parallel the distinction between nature/culture. Butler supports this second­
wave conception ofgender and provides further support for it through her reading of Freud. In her 
analysis, we find new support for the second wave's conception ofgender as a social construct, as well as 
new suggestions about how the process of social construction could take place. 
Butler says that our conception ofgender is false. We take our gender identities to be something 
real, when they are really illusory. We take them to be based on our sex, which we think is natural, but 
they are in fact based on culture, which is not natural. Butler's claims about gender are strong, but it is 
important to distinguish them from an even stronger claim that she does not make. She does not say that 
there is no fact ofthe matter when it comes to gender. What we think is there is not actually there, but 
that does not entail that there is nothing actually there, ifyou will. Butler leaves it up to her readers to 
make the further conclusion that there is nothing real out there to discover about gender? 
Butler's method is somewhat different from that oftraditional philosophers. Butler does what she 
calls a genealogy, or a historical critique. The term 'genealogy' comes from Foucault. He defines 
genealogy as "the union oferudite knowledge and local memories which allows us to establish a 
historical knowledge of struggles and to make use of this knowledge tactically today.,,4 He says that 
genealogies are" ... the tactics whereby, on the basis ofthe description of. .. local discursivities, the 
subjected knowledges which [are] thus released [and] brought into play."s This type ofanalysis draws 
heavily on empirical and historical evidence. Butler surveys history in search ofhow our perceptions 
were formed and then evaluates the product of this historical process in order to undo those subjugated 
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knowledges. Through her genealogy, she builds speculative theories and points us in a new direction for 
understanding gender identity. 
BUTLER & FREUD 
Sigmund Freud's place in the history of feminist philosophy is one ofcontention. Some feminist 
theorists see him as the enemy, a thinker caught in and reinforcing an oppressive, patriarchal code. Other 
feminist theorists see him as an ally and his work as the inspiration for the sex/gender distinction. 
Butler's reading ofFreud falls somewhere in between these two views. She uses Freud to support the 
second-wave feminist claim that gender is a cultural construct and to better explain how this process of 
construction occurs. As well as drawing from Freud's theory to support her claims, Butler also critiques 
Freud. According to Butler, Freud suggests there is no natural gender, but backslides into a theory in 
which gender must be natural. Butler states that Freud relies on natural "dispositions" in his theory of 
gender formation. If dispositions are natural and have a part in forming gender, then gender must be, at 
least in part, natural. But Freud claimed that gender was not natural, says Butler. Butler sees this as an 
inconsistency in Freud's theory. After her critical reading, Butler develops her own theory, based mainly 
on Freud's. She suggests that she can resolve the inconsistency in Freud's theory by rejecting the appeal 
to dispositions, and she thinks she can use other elements ofFreud's theory to construct a new account of 
gender formation. So, Butler takes what she likes-the conception ofgender as constructed-and rejects 
what she doesn't-some ofthe elements ofFreud's picture ofgender construction. She concludes that 
when the problems with Freud's theory are explained away and a new theory is assembled out ofthe parts 
ofhis theory that work, she has a plausible account ofgender formation and its overlay onto the sexed 
body. 
I attempt to give an explanation ofButler's reading ofFreud. Before going on to Butler's 
critique, though. I give my reading ofthe sections ofFreud with which Butler is concerned. In my 
opinion, Butler has a tendency to "use and abuse" theories from which she draws. In her writing, she 
Anna Gullickson - 6 
• 
deals with sources briefly, and then leaves them. This treatment allows her to make quick progress in her 
argument, but it also leaves background unfilled and her objections unanswered by the writers she 
critiques. 
FREUD 
The main part of Freud's theory with which Butler deals is his explanation of sexual 
development. This theory is found in Freud's Three Essays on the Theory ofSexuality, Sexuality and 
Psychology ofLove, The Ego and the Id and (though Freud didn't realize it at the time it was published) 
"Mourning and Melancholia." Freud outlines what he believes to be the original state ofchildren, the 
way they take their parents as love-objects, the way they reject their parents as love-objects, and the way 
they compensate for the loss of these love-objects. 
To understand Freud's theory, we first need to understand two ofhis terms, object and aim. 
Object and aim are the two components ofwhat Freud calls sexual desire. According to Freud, the aim is 
the sexual desire itself: the feeling. The object is the thing at which the desire is directed.6 In other 
words, the aim is what you want to do, and the object is who you want to do it with.7 Throughout life, we 
experience deviations in both our aim and our object ofour desires. Deviations in the object occur when 
an individual desires one person (or thing), but then shifts this desire to another person (or thing). 
Deviations in the aim occur when the character ofthe desire changes. Deviation of aim and object are a 
normal part of sexual development, but there are perverse types ofdeviation, and the lack ofdeviation can 
also be perverse. For Freud, the terms 'normal' and 'perverse' have no value judgements attached. Freud 
uses the term 'normal' to refer to the normative, that is, the social norm. He uses the term 'perverse' to 
refer to deviations from the social norm. 
Tn The Three Rssays, Freud directly challenges the common conception that children are not 
sexual.s Freud states that people are naturally polymorphously perverse. The first pleasure that a child 
experiences is the satiation ofhunger. The child eats by sucking, so the first aim is the activity of 
sucking. This aim is projected onto the mother, the one who typically feeds the child. More specifically, 
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the first object is the mother's breast, from which the child sucks and receives sustenance. But from here 
sexual desire develops with constant shifting of object and aim through various styles and with no set 
destination. Eventually, the wanderings ofthe constant shifting lead the child to the Oedipus complex. It 
is through the solution ofthe Oedipus complex that sexual desire reaches its normative (or non-
normative) end. 
The Oedipus complex happens in the following way. At some point in development, the sexual 
desire for the mother's breast intensifies and broadens to encompass the whole mother. Though the 
child's objects continue to shift, the child never fully lets go ofhis or her desire for the mother, and 
eventually that object reasserts itself The child now fully desires the mother and recognizes that the 
father is an obstacle in her or his way ofrealizing the desire with the mother. The child regards the father 
as a rival for the mother's love and wishes to get rid ofthe father in order to take his place with the 
mother. This feeling ofrivalry for the father is thereby paired with the feeling of identification with him 
(a desire to take his place, to become him), and the result is an ambivalent feeling for the father by the 
child. Freud believes that, up to this point, the development ofboys and girls is much the same. The 
original aim (sensual sucking) and object (the mother) are the same, as is the identification with the 
father. 
But desire does not end there. Made possible by their original bisexuality, both the girl and boy 
child develop not only a desire for the mother, but also a desire for the father. Freud's explanation for 
why the boy comes to desire the father is sketchy. Freud says: 
... in boys the Oedipus complex has a double orientation, active and passive, in 
accordance with their bisexual constitution; [a boy desires his mother and wants to take 
his father's place as the love-object of his mother, but] a boy also wants to take his 
mother's place as the love-object ofhisJather-a fact which we describe as the feminine 
attitude.9 
In The Rgo and the Td, he contrasts his realization that each child desires both parents with his contention 
earlier in his career that the boy desires only his mother. In this passage, he calls his former version of 
Oedipus, when each child desires both parents, the 'complete' Oedipus complex. He refers to the desire 
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for the parent of the opposite sex the 'positive' component ofthe complex, while he calls the desire for 
the parent ofthe same sex 'negative': 
Closer study usually discloses the more complete Oedipus complex, which is twofold, 
positive and negative, and is due to the bisexuality originally present in children: that is to 
say, a boy has not merely an ambivalent attitude towards his father and an affectionate 
object-choice towards his mother, but at the same time he also behaves like a girl and 
displays an affectionate feminine attitude to his father and a corresponding jealousy and 
hostility towards his mother. lO 
Unfortunately, Freud offers little more help in understanding why the boy takes on the desire for his 
father. 
However, Freud gives a more complete explanation ofwhy the girl takes on a desire for her 
father. Freud postulates that the little girl sees the little boy's genitals and realizes he has a penis, and that 
she doesn't. According to Freud, this incites in her an immediate desire to have a penis, as the boy does. 
According to Freud, "She makes her decision in a flash. She has seen it and knows that she is without it 
and wants to have it."l1 This phenomenon is what Freud calls penis em-yo One consequence of the 
development ofpenis envy is that the girl loosens her relation with her mother as the love-object. Freud 
is not sure quite how this works but believes that it has something to do with the girl blaming the mother 
for her lack ofpenis because the mother was the one who created her. The girl replaces her desire for a 
penis with a desire for a child, which, she takes it, her father can provide her: "She gives up her wish for 
a penis and puts in place ofit a wish for a child: and with this purpose in view she takes her father as a 
love-object. Her mother becomes an object ofjealousy."12 So, the girl's mother remains a love-object, 
and the girl's father become a love-object through her transference ofdesire for a penis to the desire to 
have a child. 
The boy also reaches a point when he discovers his genitals and how they differ from those ofthe 
little girl. In the genital stage, Freud says, the little boy "discovers" his penis-that is, it becomes the 
center ofhis attention, his primary sexual object. He explores his new discovery by handling it, but is 
told by his parents not to do this. In his parents' admonitions ofhis behavior the boy detects a 
threat-probably not explicit, but still understood by the boy child-ofcastration. The boy pays no heed 
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to these warnings until he sees the genitals ofa girl. When he sees that the girl has no penis, he assumes 
that she has been castrated, just as his parents had threatened they would do to him. After all, she does 
seem to the boy to be just like him except in this one respect. When he sees one who is, presumably, 
castrated, the threat his parents have leveled at him becomes ofmuch greater concern. The threat of 
castration is so powerful that it serves to squelch both the boy's desire for his mother and his desire for 
his father. The boy realizes that his father has a penis and his mother does not. The boy thinks that all 
people without a penis have been castrated, and so gathers that his mother, too, has been castrated. He 
realizes that to achieve his desire for his father, he would need to take the place ofhis mother, and to take 
her place, he would need to be like her. Because the boy thinks his mother is castrated, he concludes that 
he would have to become castrated to realize his desire for his father. The boy also thinks that ifhe were 
to take the place ofhis father and realize his desire for the mother, his father would punish him by 
castrating him. The boy's narcissistic attachment to his anatomy makes both ofthese options 
unacceptable for the same reason-because he would be castrated. So, the boy gives up his desire for his 
father and his mother: 
But now the acceptance of the possibility of castration, the recognition that women are 
castrated, makes an end of both the possibilities of satisfaction in the Oedipus-complex. 
For both ofthem-the male as a consequence, a punishment, and the other, the female, as 
a prerequisite-would indeed be accompanied by a loss ofthe penis. 13 
In Freud's view, this is how the boy resolves the Oedipus complex. 
For the girl child, the reason for giving up the parents as love-objects is less clear. Freud suggests 
some ways it might come to pass but admits he is unsure: 
In girls the motive for the destruction ofthe Oedipus complex is lacking. Castration has 
already had its effect. .. [the desire for the parents] may either be slowly abandoned or got 
rid ofby repression, or its effects may persist far into women's normal menta1life. 14 
Freud believes that this process has to do with the girl wanting a child and realizing that her 
parent love-objects cannot provide this child for her. Her mother is unable because ofher 
biology, and though her father has a phallus, he has chosen her mother as his love-object and is 
unavailable. Making this realization, Freud states, the girl gives up the parents as love-objects. 
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On Freud's theory, both the girl and the boy, for their respective reasons, acquire and then 
renounce their sexual desire for the mother and father. To explain how children compensate for this loss, 
Butler turns to Freud's explanation ofmelancholia. Melancholia is a disorder that Freud theorized as a 
result ofhis observation that those that suffered a loss of a loved one sometimes developed a condition of 
extreme self-reproach. Tn many patients, this feeling of self-reproach would develop to such an extreme 
that they would cease to eat. Freud endeavors to explain why those who had suffered a death of someone 
close to them might react by criticizing themselves to such an extreme. After observing many patients, he 
realizes that many of the reproaches the melancholic utters do not seem reasonably to apply to the 
melancholic. However, those same reproaches, perhaps with small modifications, do fit the lost object. 
So, a woman who had lost her husband might reproach herself for her laziness, when she was, in reality, 
not lazy at all. But laziness could have been one ofthe complaints for which the woman had reproached 
her deceased husband. Freud states: "So we find the key to the clinical picture: we perceive that the self­
reproaches are reproaches against a loved object which have been shifted away from it on to the patient's 
own ego.,,15 
Why would the patient shift their reproach from lost loved ones onto themselves? Freud says that 
it is because the object has been taken into the melancholic's identity. Freud outlines the process. A 
person feels an attachment to a love-object. The love-object dies, and the attachment is destroyed. At 
this point, the normal reaction would be for the person to withdraw her feelings for the lost love-object 
and deflect those feelings onto another object. The melancholic, though, does not accept the loss of the 
love-object. To keep the object alive in some sense, the melancholic internalizes the object. The 
melancholic identifies with the lost object. So, instead ofdeflecting the feelings for the lost object, the 
melancholic internalizes those as well. The reproaches that she used to level at the object are turned 
inward, where the object now resides. 16 
At the time he wrote "Mourning and Melancholia," Freud described the process oflosing an 
object and then internalizing that object to compensate as an occasional occurrence and a disorder. When 
he wrote The Ego and the Id, though, Freud's opinion had developed. By this time, he thought that the 
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process ofintemalization and identification present in melancholia was common. He says this process is 
essential in the formation ofthe identity. I? It is a process, he says, that is triggered by the death ofloved 
ones, but that also can occur when an object is lost through the severing ofemotional ties. When the child 
gives up his or her parent, the child is severing the emotional tie of sexual desire. Thus, as Butler says, 
this loss (of the parent) is frequently countered by "a setting up ofthe object inside the ego" just as 
happens in melancholia with the death ofa loved one. 18 
When the child suffers the loss of the parents as love-objects, the child internalizes and identifies 
with one ofthem. As Freud sees it, the boy commonly internalizes his father and reinforces his 
identification with him. Conversely, the girl commonly intemalizes and identifies with the mother. Less 
commonly, the child internalizes the parent ofthe opposite sex. Freud says the explanation for this 
pattern of internalization, in which boys identify with their fathers and girls with their mothers, is the 
'disposition' naturally within the child: 
It would appear, therefore, that in both sexes the relative strength of the masculine and 
feminine sexual dispositions is what determines whether the outcome of the Oedipus 
situation shall be an identification with the father or with the mother. This is one of the 
ways in which bisexuality takes a hand in the subsequent vicissitudes of the Oedipus 
complex.19 
According to Freud, then, each child has both a masculine and a feminine disposition, and the relative 
strength of these two dispositions determines the parent with which the child chooses to identify. It is at 
this point when the child makes this choice that the child "consolidates" his or her gender identity. When 
the child identifies with the father, Freud says, it consolidates the masculinity in the child's character. 
Likewise, when a child identifies with the mother, it consolidates the femininity in the child's character.2o 
This is how Freud believes gender identity is formed. 
BUTLER'S CRITICISMS 
Butler has problems with Freud's theory. The most obvious points ofattack would be where 
Freud himself admits that he cannot fully explain something-such as why the boy ever takes his father 
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as an object at all-but these are not the points that Butler focuses on. Butler wants to uncover more 
basic problems. She deals with the implicit assumptions underlying explicit theory. Her conclusion is 
that Freud does not satisfactorily describe gender identity fonnation because he fails to let go completely 
ofa conception ofgender as "natural." As Butler sees it, Freud claims that we are all polymorphously 
perverse, and so suggests that gender is not natural. But, claims Butler, when Freud states that 
dispositions are what detennine which parent each child identifies with, he is claiming that there is 
something natural about gender. Moreover, with his theory of dispositions, Butler claims that Freud also 
assumes a heterosexual nonn. I fmd Butler's criticism ofFreud is infonnative, though partially 
misguided. J will begin with one shallow concern that J believe arises only from Butler's misreading of 
Freud. Then, I will present what I think is her deeper concern. It is this concern from which we can draw 
a better understanding of gender identity. 
The shallow criticism that Butler raises is that she thinks that Freud assumes that the boy's 
original desire is for the mother only and that he has no reason to think this. Tfthe boy is bisexual, she 
seems to say, then he should "originally" desire both the mother and the father. Butler says that Freud 
postulates an original desire ofthe son for the mother, but not the father. After explaining the desire for 
the mother, Butler says: "With the postulation of a bisexual set oflibidinal dispositions, there is no reason 
to deny an original sexual love ofthe son for the father, and yet Freud implicitly does.,,21 I think that this 
criticism is confused in more than one way. First, in Freud's theory, no desire is "original." We do not 
come with certain desires in place at birth. According to Freud, desire develops from the first pleasure, 
the satiation ofhunger. Sucking breast milk is the process by which this satisfaction is achieved, and the 
breast, and then the whole mother, becomes the first sexual object. Second, as shown by my explication 
above, there is a reason that, at one point, the mother is desired and not the father. The mother is the one 
providing the satisfaction. It is her body that the child sucks. Third, this criticism makes it sound as if 
Butler thinks that Freud is claiming that we are all actively bisexual at birth, as ifwe all come equipped 
with sexual desires for certain objects. In truth, Freud says the child is bisexual in the sense that (s)he has 
the potential to direct her or his aim anywhere. This means the child has the potential to take either male 
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objects, female objects, or both. There is no reason to think that Freud is being inconsistent when he 
claims that the child is bisexual and yet desires the mother without desiring the father. 
The deep concern that Butler voices is that Freud thinks of desire as fimdamentally heterosexual 
and natural. She says that Freud claims to consider the child as bisexual from the beginning. This would 
mean that the child could desire either or both ofthe parents. Freud does suggest that both parents are 
desired, however, he separates the part of the psyche that desires the father from the part that desires the 
mother. The "feminine" part of the boy desires the father, while the "masculine" part desires the mother. 
Butler states: 
The conceptualization of bisexuality in terms of dispositions, feminine and masculine, 
which have heterosexual aims as their intentional correlates, suggests that for Freud 
bisexuality is the coincidence of two heterosexual desires within a single psyche. The 
masculine disposition is, in effect, never oriented toward the father as an object of sexual 
love, and neither is the feminine disposition oriented toward the mother (the young girl 
may be so oriented, but this is before she has renounced that "masculine" side of her 
dispositional nature). In repudiating the mother as an object of sexual love, the girl of 
necessity repudiates her masculinity and, paradoxically, "fixes" her femininity as a 
consequence. Hence, within Freud's thesis of primary bisexuality, there is no 
homosexuality, and only opposites attract.22 
So, Butler says, Freud thinks that the two genders can both appear in one individual, but the 
desires of the two gender identities are still both heterosexual. To be truly bisexual, one identity would 
have to desire both the male and female, and that is not what happens in Freud's theory. According to 
Freud's theory, Butler says, when a boy desires his father, it is the "feminine" part ofhim that desires the 
father, never his "masculine" part. In true bisexuality, there is an element ofhomosexuality that is here 
absent, Butler seems to claim. Freud's "bisexuality" is just "double heterosexuality.,,23 Butler says that 
"within Freud's thesis ofprimary bisexuality, there is no homosexuality, and only opposites attract.,,24 
To make the distinction between bisexuality and double heterosexuality clearer, let us step back 
for a moment and consider how these desires reside differently in the psyche ofthe bisexual and the 
double heterosexual. A man that, in Butler's opinion, is truly bisexual desires women, and so is attracted 
to the opposite sex, but also desires men, and so is attracted to the same sex. Ifwe assigned gender 
identities to the two desires within him, he would claim a masculine heterosexual and a masculine 
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homosexual. One masculine identity that desired males would exist, while another masculine identity that 
desired females would exist alongside. This is the case of a man who is "truly" bisexual, in Butler's 
opinion. The identity ofFreud's "bisexual" child would divide up differently. If the "bisexual" child's 
identity was split in two, we would have a masculine heterosexual identity and a feminine heterosexual 
one; one masculine identity that desired females would exist, and one feminine identity that desired males 
would exist. Admittedly, these identities are hypothetical. While the bisexual and double heterosexual do 
not actually have two identities, thinking ofthem in these terms helps to illustrate where Butler thinks 
Freud went wrong. Freud links desire directly to gender identity. Butler's problem with the theory is that 
only the 'feminine' disposition desires males, and only the 'masculine' disposition that desires females. 
Again, this is only a double heterosexuality. 
Butler is correct in her critique of Freud's theory of "bisexuality," but she stops short of where 
this critique is heading her. Butler is right in claiming that Freud's dispositions are inexorably linked to 
type ofdesire. For Freud, it is only with the 'masculine' disposition that one desires females, and only 
with the 'feminine' disposition that one desires males. This is clear from the way Freud proceeds from 
his introduction of dispositions into a discussion ofbisexuality in children.25 He also seems to use the 
term 'feminine' interchangeably with 'desiring a male' and 'behaving like a girl' in his explanation of a 
boy's desire for his father: 
Closer study usually discloses the more complete Oedipus complex, which is twofold, 
positive and negative, and is due to the bisexuality originally present in children: that is to 
say, a boy has not merely an ambivalent attitude towards his father and an affectionate 
object-choice towards his mother, but at the same time he also behaves like a girl and 
displays an affectionate feminine attitude to his father and a corresponding jealousy and 
hostility towards his mother. (emphasis addedi6 
In this passage, Freud discusses a boy's desire for his father in terms ofbehaving "like a girl" and having 
a "feminine attitude" towards the father. This usage is clear. Freud seems to be saying that the feminine 
disposition simply is the desiring ofthe male (the father). This should lead us to say not that Freud 
mistakenly linked desire with disposition, but that perhaps this is just what Freud meant by 'disposition'. 
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My claim that Butler misread the meaning of 'disposition' is only strengthened by another 
criticism that Butler herself raises: that Freud does not give an adequate explanation ofwhat dispositions 
are. His vague use ofthe term could easily allow for a confusion ofmeaning such as the one I am 
suggesting. Though Butler could have revamped her understanding ofthe tel11l, one can imagine why she 
would not choose to go the redefinition route. Ifwe were to take the term 'disposition' to mean 
something like 'the proclivity for this individual to desire males', then the interest ofFreud's theory for 
the gender theorist would all but completely drain out. As a gender theorist, Butler would rather interpret 
these passages in Freud as saying something about gender rather than as saying something about sexual 
orientation only, for example. I am not claiming that sexual orientation is the extent ofFreud's meaning. 
However, I do think that Butler should explore other conceptions ofthe meaning ofthe term 'disposition' 
before pronouncing it flawed and rejecting it. 
The fact that Freud declines to explain clearly what he takes dispositions to be concerns Butler. 
In Freud's theory, Butler argues, the boy must give up his desire for his mother and his father. When the 
boy does so successfully, he identifies with the father to compensate for the loss ofthe love-objects. The 
reason the child chooses this resolution and not the other is because, in identifying with his father, he is 
following his disposition. But Butler finds no proofthat these dispositions exist. She cites Freud where 
he hints that he does not know how to describe the dispositions as support for her claim.27 We have no 
explanation ofthe dispositions or any proofthat they exist, and Butler thinks we will never get any, 
either. If they do exist, she argues, we will never know it. We have no way of identifying our masculine 
and feminine dispositions at the outset, she says. After the processes ofloss, internalization and 
identification begins, we take on feminine and masculine elements into our identity which were not 
originally there. These constructed gender formations are indistinguishable from natural dispositions. As 
a result, masculinity and femininity exist in our identities, but we have no way ofknowing which 
elements ofour gender identity are natural, and which are products of internalizations. 
Butler takes this line ofreasoning even futher. Ifwe don't have any evidence for the natural 
gender dispositions and can't explain what is natural and what is not, it could be that these "dispositions" 
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exist, but are not natural after all. Butler suggests that maybe the conception that we have ofgender 
dispositions is itself a production of the internalization/identification mechanism: 
But what is the proof Freud gives us for the existence of such dispositions? If there is no 
way to distinguish between the femininity acquired through internalizations and that 
which is strictly dispositional, then what is to preclude the conclusion that all gender­
specific affinities are the consequence of internalization? On what basis are dispositional 
sexualities and identities ascribed to individuals, and what meaning can we give to 
"femininity" and "masculinity" at the outsetr8 
Perhaps our perceived "dispositions" are constructed by a series of internalizations.29 
This possibility leads Butler to suggest that the only reason that Freud connects the feminine 
disposition with a desire for the male and the masculine disposition with a desire for the female is that he, 
again, assumes a heterosexual norm. She says: "To what extent do we read the desire for father as 
evidence ofa feminine disposition only because we begin, despite the postulation ofprimary bisexuality, 
with a heterosexual matrix for desire?,,3o Freud posits bisexuality, claims Butler, but the heterosexual 
conception ofdesire still lurks behind his view, and comes to the fore in his account of dispositions. It is 
only because we are (perhaps even subconsciously) expecting women to desire men and be feminine that 
Freud theorizes a feminine disposition that desires men. 
So, Freud takes bisexuality to be primary, but doesn't follow through. Butler gives following 
through a try. She creates a theory ofgender formation without using prediscursive gender inclinations. 
She suggests that when boys give up the desire for the mother, they tend to identify with their father, not 
because ofFreud's dispositions, but because of societal pressure. It is Freud's suggestion that the fear of 
castration influences the boy to give up the mother. Butler employs the castration complex in a different 
way. Butler suggests that a different fear of "castration" convinces the boy to identify with his father 
instead ofhis mother. This "castration" is "the fear of "feminization" associated within heterosexual 
culture with male homosexuality.,,31 The boy needs to give up the desire for his mother and his father. 
When he gives them up as love-objects, he internalizes one of them to compensate for the loss. This 
internalization can be of either the father or the mother. The father is chosen because ofthe societal threat 
ofthe stigma ofbeing gay. This explains the internalization without the use of dispositions. 
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Butler's theory is compelling. Pinning gender choice on societal pressure is plausible. It is 
plausible, first, because we have no real evidence for 'dispositions' and we do have evidence for the 
contrary, that the original constitution of children is polymorphous perversity. If! had to guess, I would 
say that when Freud said that a girl more often had a stronger 'feminine disposition' than 'masculine 
disposition', he just meant that the girl was more likely to identify with her mother. This identification 
would mean that the girl would act similarly to her mother and, because it is something that her mother 
does, this would include desiring the male. When construed this way, the dispositions no longer exist in 
any meaningful way; they lose their power. They become ratios ofprobability, ifanything. If a girl's 
feminine disposition is "stronger" than her masculine disposition, then she is more likely to identify with 
her mother and take on all the characteristics that that identification entails. 
Second, unlike the shadowy dispositions, we do know that societal pressure exists and has power. 
There is a stigma in our culture against being a homosexual male. A homosexual male is seen by many as 
"less ofa man" than a heterosexual male. The castration metaphor is a bit gruesome, but it is appropriate. 
The phallus is connected by society with manliness, surely. Being actually castrated, then, makes a male 
"less ofa man" in some sense. Ifa homosexual is seen as "less ofa man," this is somehow similar to 
castration. This surely makes just as much sense-ifnot more-as Freud's original version of the 
castration complex. The parents would not actually castrate the son. The castration is symbolic; it would 
mean taking away something that the boy valued. Societal standing is valued and might be taken away if 
the boy chooses to identify with his mother instead ofhis father. So, societal "castratio," with no help 
from dispositions, is a plausible reason for the boy to identify with the father. 
The social pressure picture also helps fill in one ofthe gaps in Freud's theory, though Butler does 
not mention it. If the penalty for choosing the parent of the opposite sex to identify with is societal and 
symbolic, then we can make sense ofthe girl's choice to identify with her mother. Freud claims that the 
girl comes to desire both her parents. He also claims that she gives up this desire. However, Freud was 
unable to fully explain the girl's motivation in renouncing her sexual desire for her parents. The boy 
could be threatened with castration; the girl is immune to this threat. In her mind, claims Freud, she is 
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castrated already. However, if this "castration" is really a metaphor for societal disapproval, then the case 
can be easily modified to apply to a girl that chooses the parent ofthe same sex. Homosexual women 
suffer from a similar stigma as homosexual men. It could be argued that society sees these women as less 
womanly than the heterosexual women. So, though it is not manliness, and not due to castration, 
homosexual women are still being deprived of something that they might want-to be identified as full­
fledged women. This pressure could influence girls to identitY with their mothers instead of their fathers. 
CONCLUSION 
Butler's interpretation ofFreud, and the theory ofgender that she derives from it, is interesting. It 
gives us a way to think about gender most likely differently than how we typically do. However, we 
should not simply accept it and be satisfied. My criticisms above are just a few that one can advance 
toward this theory. I chose to limit my criticisms to Butler's application ofFreud's theory. This means 
that I addressed the accuracy ofButler's construction ofFreud. My questions were: (1) Did Freud 
actually state what Butler claims he stated? and (2) Were Butler's criticisms ofFreud legitimate? In some 
sections, I claimed her criticisms were legitimate, while, in other parts, I claimed they were based on her 
misunderstanding of Freud's texts. However, there is much more to be done with this subject than simply 
the narrow criticism that Tundertook. Butler incorporates much of Freud's thought into hers and, in doing 
so, incorporates any problems that it may possess. Thus, it seems worth asking whether or not Freud's 
theory is sound. If Freud's theory is not, then Butler's is not, either. I will not attempt a full evaluation of 
Freud's theory-that is another project-but there are a few concerns that are worth mentioning here. 
First, Freud's theory is incomplete; Freud himselfadmits this. There are things Freud claims but 
cannot support. Freud cannot, for example, fully explain why the boy takes up a desire for his father, but 
he insists that the boy does so. Butler's version ofFreud's theory aids this problem by positing societal 
castration. This modification allows for a better explanation of why the girl gives up her desire for her 
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parents, but it by no means solves the problem ofthe incompleteness ofhis theory. This one 
improvement still leaves many more elements ofFreud' s theory incomplete. 
Second, Freud uses clinical evidence to support his claims, and clinical evidence is riddled with 
problems. One problem is that the population that the clinician has to work with necessarily limits 
clinical evidence. Freud's clinical evidence is especially poor offin the respect: Freud's patients were, 
almost exclusively, all from Vienna, all upper class, and all troubled by some sort of disorder. 
Populations differ in different situations. With such a homogeneous group to work with, Freud likely 
ended up with skewed results. Also, the way that Freud went about confirming his theory is not the way 
that is generally accepted in psychological research. He did not make hypotheses and test his predictions. 
Freud only tried to explain phenomena after the fact. Thus, Freud's theory is lacking in a quality that 
scientists require oftheir theories: it does not have testable predictions?2 
This criticism reaches virtually all ofFreud's theory. One example is his process of 
internalization and identification. Without strong evidence, the existence of this process is suspect. If 
clinical evidence is not strong, then there is not sufficient support for the existence ofthis process. The 
process ofintemalization and identification are central to Freud's theory ofgender. If the process 
becomes suspect, then so does the whole theory. Another example is his theory ofpenis envy. When 
little boys and girls realize the difference in their anatomy, there is no reason that they would both come 
to the conclusion that the girl is castrated. What's more, there is no reason that the girl would decide "in a 
flash" that she wants what the boy has. There is, perhaps, a societal significance and power ofthe phallus 
that would make the girl desire to have a penis, but not at this stage ofdevelopment. At this early age, the 
girl would not appreciate the cultural significance ofthis body part. Thus, penis envy does not make 
sense. Ifclinical evidence is without decisive merit, then Freud's account ofpenis envy is not 
convincing. Ifit is not convincing, then we can reject it and create another gap in Freud's theory of 
sexual development. 
Third, even ifwe assume that internalization and identification really happen in sexual 
development, there are specifics needed to complete the theory that do not necessarily appear. At the 
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critical point in gender development, when the children give up their parental love-objects, Freud says the 
children must internalize just one parent. But there is no reason that identification would need to be 
limited to only one. Freud is clear in his belief that the process ofintemalization and identification is 
ongoing. We continuously give up and internalize objects throughout our lives. Why the child would 
necessarily give up the parents at the same time and choose to identifY with only one is unclear. There is 
no reason that the child would not give up the parents at different times, and identify with each in turn, 
taking elements ofeach into his or her identity. Even if the mother and father objects are renounced 
simultaneously, there is no reason to think that only one would be internalized. Perhaps a dual 
internalization and identification could occur; both parents could concurrently be taken in and identified 
with. That only one parent is internalized is a huge assumption on Freud's part, and it is not supported. 
Given these holes in Freud's theory, it would seem that Butler's theory, too, suffers from fatal 
flaws. To correct this, she would have to deal with these problems in Freud's theory and either fix them 
or find another way to ground her own theory. However, she does neither ofthese things. Moreover, 
these are only a few ofthe issues that we would need to address for a complete evaluation of Butler's 
work. My list ofproblems is by no means exhaustive. Acknowledging that these problems, for now" 
remain unsolved, we can make the intennediate conclusion that Butler's theory ofgender fonnation is 
interesting, but inconclusive. In the development of feminist philosophy, Butler leaves us a step further 
forward than we were before. She reminds us how fundamental the heterosexual nonn is to Western 
thinking. She reveals that even Freud, whose theory had a part in displacing the heterosexual norm, still 
relies on its assumptions. She also advances Freud's theory by ridding it of some of these 
inconsistencies: she rejects dispositions and suggests societal castration. Butler gives a sketch ofthe 
development ofgender identity, even if this sketch is imperfect and incomplete. It is a helpful effort in 
our continued endeavors to understand gender identity. Her theory provides us with both an additional 
way to understand gender and an opportunity for further critical development in gender theory. 
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